1 RODNEY J. JACOB, ESQ. DANIEL M. BENJAMIN, ESQ. JENNIFER A. CALVO-QUITUGUA, ESQ. CALVO & CLARK, LLP 3 FILED Attorneys at Law 655 South Marine Corps Drive, Suite 202 4 Tamuning, Guam 96913 DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM 5 Telephone: (671) 646-9355 JAN -8 2007 --Facsimile: (671) 646-9403 6 MARY L.M. MORAN CHRISTOPHER E. CHALSEN, ESQ. 7 CLERK OF COURT MICHAEL M. MURRAY, ESQ. LAWRENCE T. KASS, ESQ. 8 MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP 9 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 10005 10 Telephone: (212) 530-5000 Facsimile: (212) 822-5796 11 Attorneys for Defendants 12 FUJITSU LIMITED AND FUJITSU MICROELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC. 13 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 DISTRICT OF GUAM 16 NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORP. and CIVIL CASE NO. 06-CV-00025 17 NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORP. U.S.A, 18 Plaintiff, **DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO** 19 PLAINTIFFS' JANUARY 5, 2007 -V-FILING REGARDING THE 20 FUJITSU LIMITED, FUJITSU REQUESTED HEARING DATE ON MICROELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., 21 **DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS** Defendants. 22 23 24 25 26 27

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Fujitsu Microelectronics America, Inc. ("FMA") and Fujitsu Limited ("Fujitsu")(collectively "Defendants") hereby respond to "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Requested Hearing Date on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss", Dkt. No. 107 ("Nanya's Reply"), in which plaintiffs Nanya Technology Corporation and Nanya U.S.A. (collectively "Nanya") argue that (1) they have not delayed resolution of motions filed by each of FMA (Dkt. No.74) and Fujitsu (Dkt. No. 89), seeking dismissal of this case and other relief ("Motions to Dismiss") and (2) that they have a right to conduct jurisdictional discovery prior to a hearing on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.

On the issue of delay, Nanya is clearly playing games with the local rules in an attempt to delay the day on which it will have to justify the choice of Guam for this dispute. FMA's motion was filed on December 5, 2006 and at that time FMA asked for January 17, 2007 as the hearing date and sought Nanya's position on a suitable date. (*See* Dkt. No. 76.) Nanya expressed no preference for a hearing date until December 29, 2007, *twenty-four* days later. It then asked that the hearing be set on or after March 20, 2007, more than three and a half *months* after FMA's motion was filed. Presumably Nanya knew on December 5th that it disagreed with the proposed January 17th hearing date, yet it has offered no explanation for its delay in making its hearing date preferences known. Indeed, Nanya simply appears to have ignored the fact that the due dates for it to respond to Fujitsu's and FMA's motions provided in this court's docket entries for this case have already passed. Nanya's tactics are evident; it waited until shortly before its opposition would have been due with the January 17th hearing date, and then filed its request for a much later date. Nanya is clearly trying to delay the resolution of these motions.

Concerning the issue of jurisdictional discovery, Nanya cites only Commissariat A L'Energie Atomique v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 395 F.3d 1315 (Fed Cir. 2005), but this case does not support Nanya's position. In that patent infringement case, defendant also moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1317. In opposing the motion plaintiff presented substantial specific evidence concerning defendant's relevant forum contacts, including: (1) an identification of the accused devices (i.e, LCD monitors); (2) evidence that

defendant had shipped 2,950,000 units of the accused devices in the first five months of 2003; (3) evidence of an established distribution network for the accused devices; (4) evidence of specific orders for the accused devices in Delaware (the subject forum); and (5) evidence of actual sales of the accused devices in Delaware. *Id.* Plaintiff had asked for jurisdictional discovery to "conclusively establish that [defendant] CMO derives substantial revenue from Delaware...". *Id.* at 1319. The district court refused the request for jurisdictional discovery and granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. *Id.*

The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff "has clearly made a sufficient threshold showing to merit jurisdictional discovery." *Id* at 1323. Thus, because of the detailed evidence that plaintiff had presented concerning extensive sales of the accused devices, including sales within the relevant forum, the Federal Circuit held that jurisdictional discovery should have been permitted. *Id*. On the other hand, in situations "[w]here a plaintiff's claim of personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and based on bare allegations in the face of specific denials made by defendants, the Court need not permit even limited discovery" *Terracom v. Valley Nat. Bank*, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction after refusing to allow jurisdictional discovery).

Nanya has not even come close to the "sufficient threshold" found by the Federal Circuit to warrant jurisdictional discovery in *Commissariat A L'Energie Atomique*. 395 F. 3d at 1317. Indeed, Nanya has not even *identified* the accused products, let alone come forward with the kind of detailed evidence of relevant contacts with the subject forum found sufficient to meet the threshold for jurisdictional discovery. *Id.* Instead, Nanya is closer to the position of the plaintiff in *Terracom*, with only attenuated alleged contacts with the subject forum. In fact, Nanya is in an even worse position than the plaintiff in *Terracom*. In *Terracom* plaintiff had provided evidence that defendant had executed a surety certificate for a construction project in the subject forum, and the cause of action was based on a breach of contract related to the construction project. *Id.* at 557. Here, Nanya has yet to identify a single relevant contact between defendants and Guam or between the cause of action and Guam.

Accordingly, because Nanya has not come forward with sufficient evidence of relevant contacts between Defendants and Guam it is not entitled to spend the next several months engaged in a jurisdictional fishing expedition. Defendants thus respectfully request that Nanya's unjustified attempt to delay the resolution of the Motions to Dismiss be denied and that the hearing go forward as noticed on January 17, 2007.

Respectfully submitted this 8th day of January, 2007.

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commencement of discovery is itself in violation of this Court's Order.

Nanya claims that it has "already begun jurisdictional discovery." (Nanya's Reply at 3.)

However, it has merely served a set of document requests, which Defendants believe were improperly

served in view of this Court's Order dated December 11, 2006 that reset the scheduling conference for January 30, 2007, noting that "Plaintiffs will not be substantially prejudiced by a short extension of the

scheduling conference and commencement of discovery." Order at 2. Thus, Nanya's attempted

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